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In this paper, we investigate the association between the purpose of a loan and the type of debt 
covenants, separated into balance-sheet-based and income-statement-based covenants. We use 
private loan deal observations obtained from the DealScan database over the period between 
1996 and 2013. We classify our sample loan deals into three categories based on the purpose of 
borrowing, namely borrowings for corporate daily operating purposes, financing purposes, and 
acquisition and investing purposes. Our results provide evidence that the purpose of the loan is 
significantly associated with the type of debt covenants, suggesting that the lender and the 
borrower have considered the loan purpose when structuring their debt agreements. More 
specifically, the results indicate that the loans borrowed to fund acquisitions or long-term 
investment projects are more likely to have income-statement-based covenants, and less likely to 
have balance-sheet-based covenants. In contrast, the loans borrowed for corporate daily 
operating purposes or financing purposes are more likely to contain balance-sheet-based 






The use of debt covenants to improve transparency and efficiency in private commercial 
loans has generated a greater interest in the variety of covenants observed in the market. Our 
study builds on a growing literature that examines the type of debt covenants found in private 
loan contracts. Dichev and Skinner (2002) conclude that loan covenants are not “boilerplate.” 
Rather, covenants generally reflect characteristics of the lender and the borrower. For example, 
creditors may adjust covenants to reflect the financial characteristics of the borrower. Aghion 
and Bolton (1992) develop a model in which a firm’s financial constraints help determine the 
type of covenants found in debt contracts. Similarly, Christensen and Nikolaev (2012) argue that 
balance-sheet- and income-statement-based financial ratios serve different purposes in 
covenants. They find that the choice of financial ratio type in debt covenants, balance sheet or 
income statement, is influenced by a firm’s financing constraints. Demerjian (2011) and  
Christensen and Nikolaev (2012) document increasing income-statement-based- and decreasing 
balance-sheet-based ratios found in debt covenants over time. Demerjian (2011) attributes this 
decline to the shift toward a “balance sheet approach” in accounting standards, which makes the 
balance sheet too volatile for contracting purposes.   
In this paper, we investigate the association between the purpose of the loan and the type 
of debt covenants, separated into income-statement- and balance-sheet-based covenants. Our 
study is the first to identify differences in trends over time for the use of income-statement- and 
balance-sheet-based covenants as it relates to different loan purposes. Our study is closely related 
to Demerjian (2011) and Christensen & Nikolaev (2012), who investigate the use of balance-
sheet- versus income-statement-based covenants. Aghion & Bolton (1992) and Christensen & 
Nikolaev (2012) argue that balance-sheet-based covenants in debt contracts align interests 
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between the borrower and the lender, while income-statement-based covenants contribute to the 
transfer of control rights from the borrower to the lender. We build on prior research to examine 
the degree to which loan purpose is associated with the choice between income-statement-based- 
and balance-sheet-based covenants.  
Our analysis uses 6,613 loan deal observations obtained from the DealScan database over 
the period between 1996 to 2013. We first investigate the purposes for borrowing on a private 
loan, and the dollar amount of loans by loan purpose. We find that the most common reason for 
borrowing on a loan is to use the money for corporate daily operating purposes, and the second 
most prevalent purpose for a loan is to pay down the balance on another loan. In addition, we 
investigate the association between the purpose of the loan and the type of debt covenants, 
separated into balance-sheet-based and income-statement-based covenants.  
We conduct multinomial logit regression analysis to test the relationship between the 
choice of financial ratios in a debt covenant and the purpose of a loan, controlling for financing 
constraints and other factors that have been identified as important to debt covenant analysis in 
prior studies (e.g., Chava and Roberts 2008; Christensen and Nikolaev 2012). Our regression 
analysis provides evidence that the purpose of the loan is significantly associated with the type of 
debt covenants, suggesting that the lender and the borrower consider the loan purpose when 
structuring their debt agreements. Our results indicate that the loans borrowed for the corporate 
daily operating purposes or for financing needs, such as to repay debt, recapitalize capital 
structure, or to buy back stock, are more likely to include balance-sheet-based ratios, and less 
likely to include income-statement-based ratios in the covenants. On the other hand, debt 
covenants attached to the loans to fund acquisitions or long-term investment projects are more 
likely to use income-statement-based ratios relative to balance-sheet-based ratios. 
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More specifically, the results indicate that loan contracts for investment and acquisition 
purposes, rather than operating or financing purposes, are significantly more likely to include 
income-statement-based financial ratio covenants. In a second specification, we further delineate 
loan purpose and find that loans for operating activities and financial purposes both increase the 
likelihood that the loan will include balance sheet ratios and decrease the likelihood of income 
statement ratios. These findings contain important and economically significant implications 
indicating that loan lenders and borrowers agree to include different types of accounting 
information (that is, income-statement- versus balance-sheet-based financial ratios) in their loan 
covenants for different purpose loans. 
 Overall, our findings imply that the loan purpose is a significant factor in determining the 
choice of accounting information used in covenants. These results extend the findings of 
Demerjian (2011) and Christensen and Nikolaev (2012), suggesting that loan purpose is an 
important consideration in addition to other financing constraints.  
 The following section presents a background on debt covenants and outlines empirically 
testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and our empirical methodology. Section 4 
reports results and robustness tests.  Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
2. BACKGROUND and HYPOTHESES 
2.1: Loan Borrowing and Debt Covenants 
Debt covenants often accompany private loans as a means for the lender to reduce its 
exposure to default. In general, debt covenants are designed to reduce agency costs by creating 
the conditions under which control rights transfer to creditors (Aghion and Bolton 1992; Tirole 
2006; Chava and Roberts 2008). Apilado and Millington (1992) show that covenants are more 
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prevalent for smaller firms and for larger loans, suggesting the role of covenants as a measure of 
protection in uncertain environments. Loan covenants that are not sufficiently strict may result in 
an inability of the lending company to recognize financial danger, while overly stringent 
covenants may impede the borrower’s ability to operate successfully. In this way, lenders 
carefully use covenants to protect their investments.  Dichev and Skinner (2002) and Chava and 
Roberts (2008) provide evidence that lenders set tight covenants and use minor violations to take 
action in modifying the loan agreement.  
For borrowers, covenants may generate restrictions on business activities but provide an 
additional means of demonstrating financial and operational stability.  In many cases, borrowers 
are willing to accept restrictive debt covenants as doing so decreases the cost of debt (Reisel 
2009; Billett et al. 2007).  Bradley and Roberts (2015) provide evidence that loan yields are 
lower when companies include covenants in their loan agreements. They also document that 
there is a positive relation between the inclusion of covenants and the maturity of a loan. Given 
their role in facilitating efficient loan agreements, covenants have taken on a large role in the 
loan market.   
Both positive debt covenants, which refer to actions that the borrowing company must 
fulfill, and negative debt covenants, which set restrictions on the borrowing company’s activities, 
frequently make use of financial ratios. For example, a company may be required to maintain a 
current ratio over 1.0, demonstrating its ability to cover its short-term debt. These ratios provide 
lenders with the information to monitor a borrower’s financial condition and offer the lender 
further insight into the current and future financial status of the borrowing company (Whited, 
1992). It is important to note that the use of financial ratios in debt covenants is quite common. 
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Demerjian (2007) finds that 78% of the deals in a sample of 16,364 syndicated loan agreements 
include at least one financial ratio.  
In Table 1, the most common financial covenants are organized into six subcategories.  
We first classify the financial ratios identified in Dealscan as either income statement or balance 
sheet ratios based on the source of financial information used in calculation of the ratio, 
consistent with prior research (Demerjian and Owens, 2016; Christensen and Nikolaev, 2012; 
Demerjian, 2011).  They are first labeled by their relative financial statement, followed by their 
subcategory.  The six types (subcategories) of financial ratio covenants include the following: 1. 
interest coverage, 2. debt-to-earnings, 3. current ratio, 4. net worth, 5. leverage, and 6. debt 
amount.  While the two subcategories for the income-statement-based ratios have five 
accounting-based ratios, the four subcategories of the balance sheet-based financial ratios have 
seven financial ratios commonly used in loan covenants. Among these financial ratio covenants, 
debt to EBITDA ratio has by far the highest frequency (59.0%), followed by debt to assets 
(17.7%) and debt to tangible net worth (7.5%). 
(Insert Table 1 about here.) 
Our research question explores whether variation in the type of debt covenant used 
(income-statement-based versus balance-sheet-based) is related to the purpose of the loan.  To 
examine this question, we classify loans into one of three groups based on the purpose of the 
loan: 1) Acquisition and Investing, 2) Operating, or 3) Financing. In Panel A of Table 2, we 
define the subgroups within loan purpose groups to provide more information on the types of 
business activities included in each group. 




2.2: Prior Studies and Hypotheses Development 
 Firms acquire new debt from three main sources: public debt, bank private loans, and 
non-bank private loans. Diamond (1984) and Boyd and Prescott (1986) argue that private debt 
has significant advantages over public debt in terms of monitoring efficiency. 
 Previous research has examined the role that debt covenants play in determining 
parameters of the private debt. Dichev and Skinner (2002) argue that covenants act as an early 
warning device that allow lenders to shorten the loan maturity. Regarding the specific nature of 
the covenant, Demiroglu and James (2010) find that violations of loosely set covenants have a 
more severe impact on business activities. This implies that the covenant agreement includes 
information about the borrower’s expected future financial position.   
 Furthermore, evidence suggests that debt covenants serve as useful mechanisms to 
address agency problems. Dichev and Skinner (2002) find that debt covenant violations lead to 
higher interest rates. More generally, their results indicate that covenant violations are somewhat 
frequent and act as useful signals that loan adjustments are necessary. Similarly, Chava and 
Roberts (2008) find significant declines in a firm’s capital investment due to changes in credit 
lines and interest spreads following a violation of loan covenants. Firms may also face an 
increased likelihood of losing control of rights through debt restructuring or the acceleration of 
debt payments (Nini et al. 2009; Ozelge 2007).   
 Recent research demonstrates that balance-sheet-based ratios, which act as a constraint on 
leverage, are used less frequently by financially constrained firms than are income-statement-
based ratios in debt covenants (Christensen and Nikolaev 2012).  This is consistent with Dichev 
and Skinner’s (2002) conclusion that creditors adjust covenants to reflect the financial 
characteristics of the borrower.  Moreover, the decrease in the use of balance sheet ratios in debt 
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covenants is well documented (Demerjian 2011; Skinner 2011; Christensen and Nikolaev 2012).  
Demerjian (2011, p. 179) argues that the decline in the use of accounting information in debt 
contracting is a result of accounting standard setters’ movement toward a balance sheet approach 
in financial reporting. Such a change in practices makes the balance sheet a less useful tool for 
debt contracting purposes since it may contain increased volatility about true asset and liability 
values (Demerjian, 2011). 
 Our study builds on a growing literature that explores the type of debt covenants found in 
loan contracts. Aghion and Bolton (1992) develop a model in which a firm’s financial constraints 
help determine the type of covenants found in debt contracts. They base their model of capital 
structure on incomplete contracts theory, which proposes that financial contracts use accounting 
information to align the interests of the owners of a firm (shareholders) with its creditors.  They 
argue that debt financing is an efficient way of allocating contingent control between creditors 
and shareholders. This can be done by establishing covenants that specify the financial 
conditions that a firm must maintain. If the firm breaks its covenants, control passes to the 
creditors. 
 Christensen and Nikolaev (2012) apply the Aghion and Bolton (1992) model to a setting 
that differentiates balance sheet and income statement based covenants. They argue that balance 
sheet ratios serve as accurate measures of investment in the firm but provide an insufficient 
picture of future performance. Income statement ratios, however, reflect current performance and 
thus offer more information regarding timely financial problems.  The authors find that 
covenants tend to include relatively more income statement ratios as the borrowing firm becomes 
financially constrained, supporting their argument that loan agreements will reflect lender and 
borrower preferences for specific types of information. 
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 We extend the Christensen and Nikolaev (2012) study to incorporate loan purpose as an 
additional factor in debt covenant agreements. We hypothesize that loan purposes influence the 
choice of income statement versus balance sheet metrics included in debt covenants. From the 
lender’s perspective, the risk on the loan will be directly related to the manner in which the 
money is used. For example, if a firm borrows on a loan to provide money for acquisitions or 
investing purposes, the lender is likely to consider this a riskier loan than a loan to fund daily 
operating activities or financing purposes. Firms’ acquisitions or investing-related activities are 
rather long-term and forward looking, and therefore carry a higher risk for the lender.  As 
discussed above, income statement metrics may provide better forward-looking financial 
information.  
In addition, when lenders write debt covenants to fund the borrowers’ long-term-oriented 
events such as takeover, acquisition line, leveraged buyout, capital expenditure, equipment 
purchase, and so on, lenders have an incentive to ensure that the borrowing firms have strong 
current and future profitability to support these acquisition or investing-related activities. A 
firm’s profitability is summarized and reported in income statement. For this reason, we expect 
lenders to use income statement covenants for loans that fund long-term activities. Our first 
hypothesis follows:  
 
H1:  Debt covenants for a loan borrowed for long-term investment or acquisitions are 





 In contrast, we anticipate that if a firm borrows on a loan to provide money for daily 
corporate operations or financing purposes, the lender is more likely to use balance sheet metrics 
relative to income statement metrics in debt covenants. These predictions are based on the notion 
that balance sheet ratios provide lenders with valuable information about the borrower’s level of 
investment within the firm. Furthermore, balance sheet ratios likely provide a better summary of 
the borrowing firm’s financial standing, such as its liquidity and solvency. For loans that will be 
used to cover current financing or daily operations, lenders may be more interested in balance 
sheet information.  
Christensen and Nikolaev (2012) argue that the role of balance-sheet covenants in debt 
contracts is to align lender–borrower interests by requiring that borrowers maintain enough 
capital inside the company. Balance-sheet covenants depend on information about sources and 
uses of capital (i.e., balance sheet information only) and thus directly limit the level of debt in a 
company’s capital structure. When lenders and borrowers prepare debt covenants for loans to 
fund borrowers’ daily activities, such as increasing working capital, or to fund financing 
activities, such as debt repayments or CP backup (Commercial Paper backup line of credit),1 
lenders must ensure that the borrowing firms have sufficient capital to repay the debt and 
interest. A firm’s capital structure is summarized and reported in the balance-sheet. Two 
additional hypotheses follow: 
 
H2a:  Debt covenants for a loan borrowed for daily corporate operations are more likely 
to contain balance-sheet-based covenants, relative to income-statement-based covenants. 
 
1 A CP backup line of credit (LOC) protects a company’s investors if the company defaults on its commercial paper. 
To protect investors from default, the company can pay a fee to a bank in exchange for a backup line. The CP 





H2b:  Debt covenants for a loan borrowed for financing purposes are more likely to  
contain balance-sheet-based covenants, relative to income-statement-based covenants. 
 
3. SAMPLE, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, and METHODS 
3.1: Sample 
We use the Compustat North America database to collect firms’ financial statement data 
for the period 1996 to 2013.2 We exclude regulated industries, i.e. financial firms and utilities 
that have industry specific accounting rules. In addition, we use the Dealscan database to 
determine the financial ratios contained in debt covenants. Dealscan collects firms’ loan 
information from their financial filings with the SEC.3  The size of the deals varies from 
$100,000 to $13 billion.  We then merge the Compustat and Dealscan data sets. We require all 
firms to have valid data for all variables included in our regression models. Finally, we remove 
the extreme outlier values for certain variables (FinConstraint-WW, FinConstraint-KZ, 
FinConstraint-CL, and VR)4 by eliminating the top and the bottom one percent of the 
observations.5  This process results in a final sample containing 6,613 firm-year observations. 
3.2: Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 displays our sample loan deals based on loan purpose and loan deal amount. 
Panel A indicates that the most common reason for borrowing on a loan is for operating 
 
2 The first year that the DealScan database reports data is 1996. The sample year is fiscal year. 
3 The majority of firms included in Dealscan are publicly listed companies however, to a limited degree, Dealscan 
also gathers privately held companies’ loan information from bank submissions. 
4 FinConstraint-WWit,  FinConstraint-KZit, and FinConstraints-CLit are index of financial constraints based on 
Whited and Wu (2006), Kaplan and Zingales (1997), and Cleary (1999), respectively. VR is the volatility ratio 
suggested by Demerjian (2011). All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
5 We repeated our main regression analyses using the winsorized data. The sample size of the winsorized data is 
7,008. The results from the winsorized sample are qualitatively consistent (not reported) with those from the 
truncated sample.  
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purposes, which includes daily operating activities and working capital. This comprises 60.7% of 
the total sample. Aside from operating purposes, financing purposes account for 24.1% of the 
sample, primarily in the form of debt repayment (18.3%). The remaining 15.3% of the sample 
includes loans for Acquisition and Investing. Within this group, acquisition activities make up 
the majority of observations (14.6% of the total sample), while investing activities make up only 
0.7% of the total sample.   
 In Panel A of Table 2, we also report the mean and median size of loans for each loan 
purpose group. For the entire sample, the mean loan amount is $441 million with a median of 
$200 million, implying a distribution that exhibits a slight positive skew. Operating and 
Financing activities have mean loan amounts of $409 million and $366 million, respectively, 
similar to the overall sample mean. The distribution of loan amounts in the Acquisition and 
Investing group indicates larger amounts than the other two groups, with a mean of $684 million 
and a median of $250 million.  
In Panel B of Table 2, we report the frequency of loan deals by loan purposes over our 
sample period, along with the portion of total loans each year that were used for a specific 
purpose.  We see evidence in columns (5-6) that financing purpose transactions decrease 
gradually in terms of absolute numbers and percentages. Conversely, we see sharp increase in 
operating purpose borrowing transactions from 2001, indicated by columns (3-4). Overall, loan 
transactions decrease gradually from 2006-2009, but appear to rebound in 2010. This pattern is 
likely the result of economic recession. Similarly, focusing on years of economic down-turns, (at 
the trough and right after the trough of economic cycle such as years) in 2001, 2002, 2003, and 
2009, the frequency of loans for acquisition & investing purposes is smaller relative to remaining 
years and below the mean of 15.3% across years. We expect that in economic downturns lenders 
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are reluctant to lend money for the acquisition and investment or other aggressive business 
activities, as it may increase financial risk. It is important to note that throughout these years of 
the 2007-2009 recession and after, trends for loan purpose type generally remain consistent, as 
operating purpose loans continue to make up a larger portion of the total. Thus, we do not 
believe there is any structural break that would affect our empirical analysis.  
 Panel C of Table 2 reports similar statistics to Panel B but in terms of loan value, 
presenting mean loan size (in US million dollars) and the portion of total loan value each year 
allocated to each loan purpose.  Patterns in loan value closely follow patterns in the number of 
loans seen in Panel B.  In terms of percentage, financing purpose loan value decreases gradually 
(53.6% in 1996 to 2.8% in 2013) while operating purpose loan amount increases sharply from 
2001 (9.5% in 1996 to 37.0% in 2001, and to 85.6% in 2013). 
 Table 3 displays the count of loans by purpose and by debt covenant. In Panel A, we 
report the number of loans for each purpose with an income statement (IS) debt covenant as a 
percent of the total number of loans for that purpose, and similarly for balance sheet (BS) debt 
covenants. This summary indicates that IS-covenants tend to be more common than BS 
covenants in the sample period.6  In addition, the use of BS covenants steadily decreases, 
regardless of the loan purpose. The use of IS covenants is fairly stable for financing and 
acquisition and investment loans, but we see an increase in IS covenants attached to operating 
loans.  
(Insert Table 3 about here.) 
 





 Panel B of Table 3 shows the breakdown of loans by purpose for each debt covenant 
category. For both subsets, loans with IS covenants and loans with BS covenants, similar trends 
are apparent. Loans for financing activities decrease steadily from more than half of the total 
number of loans to less than five percent of loans. For acquisition and investment loans, there is 
a small increase in the percent of loans from 1996-2000, followed by a drop to the point where 
these loans also make up less than ten percent of all loans. Conversely, the percent of loans for 
operating activities, among loans with IS covenants and among those with BS covenants, rises 
sharply. 
 Overall, our data indicate an increase in the use of IS covenants, particularly for operating 
loans, and a sharp decrease in the use of BS covenants. While the increase in IS covenants is 
driven primarily by the trend in loan for operating purposes, the decrease in BS covenants is 
clear for all loan purposes. Considering that operating purpose loans make up the majority of the 
sample (4,011 of the 6,613 observations, or 60.7%), our results are consistent with the findings 
of Demerjian (2011) related to increasing IS (decreasing BS) covenant ratios. Our study is the 
first to identify differences in trends over time for the use of IS and BS covenants as it relates to 
different loan purposes. In the next section, we present our methodology for exploring these 
patterns more formally and in greater detail. 
3.2: Method 
  We use a multinomial logistic regression model to investigate the relationship between 
loan purpose and the use of income statement (IS) or balance sheet (BS) ratios in debt covenants. 
We use the following specification to model the likelihood of a BS or an IS covenant as part of 







) = β0k + β(1k to 3k)* LoanPurposeit + β(4k to 9k)* Financial Constraint Variablesit  
                            + β10k *VRit + β11k*Sizeit + β12k*Book-to-Marketit + β13k*ROAit + β14k*Lossit + β15k* Advit   
                            + β16k*R&Dit + β17k*Tangibleit + β18k*Z-Scoreit + β19k*StdRetit + β20k*DealSizeit  
                            + β21k*Maturityit  + β22k*Revolverit+ β23k*Securedit                                           (Model 1-4)                                                                                                    
 
                 where k indicates inclusion of balance-sheet-based ratios or income-statement-based ratio. 
   
  LoanPurposeit  The purpose of the loan (LoanPurpose_Operit or LoanPurpose_Finanit or 
LoanPurpose_InvAcqit, where  
  LoanPurpose_Operit  = 1 if the purpose of the loan is to fund daily corporate operating activities; 0 
otherwise 
  LoanPurpose_Finanit = 1 if the purpose of the loan is to fund financing activities; 0 otherwise 
  LoanPurpose_Inv&Acqit = 1 if the purpose of the loan is to fund investing or acquisition activities; 0 
otherwise 
Financial Constraint Variables (used in 4 models alternatively) 
Model 1:  
Ageit    = Natural logarithm of the number of years the firm in CRSP 
Dividendsit = Dividend yield defined as the ratio of common dividends to the market 
value of equity  
Leverageit   = Ratio of long-term debt to market value of total assets 
Model 2:    
FinConstraint-WWit   = Index of financial constraints based on Whited and Wu (2006) 
Model 3:   
FinConstraint-KZit     = Index of financial constraints based on Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
Model 4:   
FinConstraints-CLit     = Index of financial constraints based on Cleary (1999) 
 
Other Control Variables 
 
VRit = Ratio of book value volatility to adjusted net income volatility as defined 
in Demerjian (2011) 
Sizeit = Natural logarithm of the market value of total assets 
Book-to-Marketit = Book-to-market ratio 
ROAit = Return on assets 
Lossit = 1 if the firm has negative net income; 0 otherwise 
Advit = Advertising expense divided by total revenue 
R&Dit                 = R&D expense divided by total revenue 
Tangibleit = Asset tangibility defined as the ratio of net value of property, plant, and 
equipment to total assets 
Z-Scoreit = Altman’s credit risk score 
StdRetit    = Natural logarithm of the standard deviation of daily returns over the fiscal 
year 
DealSizeit = Natural logarithm of total deal 
Maturityit    = Months to maturity 
Revolverit = 1 if a revolving facility exists in the deal package; 0 otherwise 
Securedit    = 1 if debt is secured; 0 otherwise 
 
The primary objective of the model is to measure the impact of loan purpose on the 
inclusion of a BS or an IS covenant. However, our model includes a number of control variables 
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that indicate properties of the loan and properties of the borrowing firm. These variables have 
been identified as important to debt covenant analysis in prior research (e.g., Chava and Roberts 
2008; Christensen and Nikolaev 2012). We use the volatility ratio (VR), identified by Demerjian 
(2011) to measure the volatility in adjustments introduced to balance sheet items. Other variables 
capture the current capital state of the firm through the value of total assets (Size), the firm’s 
book-to-market ratio (Book-to-Market), asset tangibility (Tangible), and credit risk (Z-Score). To 
control for income and expenses, we include an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has 
negative net income (Loss), advertising expenses as a percent of total revenue (Adv), research 
and development expenses (R&D), and the standard deviation of daily returns over the fiscal 
year (StdRet). Finally, in addition to loan purpose, we include other potentially important aspects 
of the loan, such as the size of the loan (DealSize), the number of months to maturity (Maturity), 
and indicator variables for a revolving facility in the loan (Revolver) and for secured debt 
(Secured).  
We also include financial constraint variables in the models. This inclusion of financial 
constraints variables follows an extensive prior finance and accounting literature (e.g., 
Christensen and Nikolaev 2012; Paik et al. 2015). There are several potential ways to measure 
and control for financial constraints in this context. We follow Christensen and Nikolaev (2012) 
to construct four different sets of indexes to measure firms’ finance constraints: (1) Age, 
Dividends, and Leverage, (2) FinConstraint-WW as suggested in Whited and Wu (2006), (3) 
FinConstraint-KZ as suggested by Kaplan and Zingales (1997), and (4) FinConstraint-CL from 
Cleary (1999).7 Following Christensen and Nikolaev (2012), we conduct four separate 
regressions, Models (1) – (4), where each specification includes alternative financing constraint 
 
7 More detailed explanations of these financial constraint variables are presented in Appendix A. 
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measures to avoid multi-collinearity. All models include the remaining control variables listed 
above and differ only in the variables used to measure financial constraints.  
Model (1) includes several firm-specific characteristics as proxies for financial 
constraints, including Age, Dividends and Leverage. We expect that older (Age) and dividend 
paying (Dividends) firms are less likely to be financially constrained, whereas highly leveraged 
(Leverage) firms are more likely to be financially constrained. Model (2)-(4) include 
FinConstraint–WW, FinConstraint–KZ and FinConstraint-CL, respectively, as measures of 
financial constraint. We expect a negative impact of financial constraint on the likelihood of 
having a BS covenant and a positive impact of financial constraint on the likelihood of having an 
IS covenant.  
 Table 4 reports summary statistics for the variables included in our main regressions. The 
mean values of our variables of interest, IScovenants and BScovenants, are 0.878 and 0.376, 
respectively, suggesting that on average, IS covenants are included more frequently than BS 
covenants. The mean values of Age (2.750), Dividends (0.009), Leverage (0.187), and of other 
financial constraint variables such as FinConstraint–WW, FinConstraint–KZ, and FinConstraint-
CL are similar to the means reported in Christensen and Nicholaev (2012) and Paik et al. (2015). 
Additionally, the mean value of VR (Volatility Ratio) is 1.903, and it is similar in size to the 
mean value of 1.922 reported in Demerjian (2011). The mean values of all other control 
variables reported in Table 4 are consistent with those reported in prior studies such as 
Christensen and Nicholaev (2012) and Paik et al. (2015). In sum, our basic descriptive statistics 
suggest that our sample is consistent with the samples used in prior research examining debt 
covenants. We now turn to our logit analysis to further explore the relationship between loan 
purpose and debt covenants. 
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(Insert Table 4 about here.) 
 
4. RESULTS 
 Before discussing results of the multinomial logit analysis, we present mean differences 
for the prevalence of IS and BS covenants. Panel A of Table 5 reports the portion of loans in our 
sample that contains an IS or BS covenant, disaggregated by loan purpose. Loans for acquisition 
and investing purposes tend to rely on IS covenants, as 94 percent include IS-based covenants 
while only 27 percent include BS-based covenants. Shares of operating (financing) purpose loans 
with IS-based and BS-based covenants are 87 (85) percent and 35 (51) percent, respectively.   
(Insert Table 5 about here.) 
Panel B reports statistical tests for the mean difference in use of IS-based covenants 
across loan purpose types. Here we use a chi-squared test for the overall mean differences in the 
presence of multiple groups and use the Marascuilio procedure for pair-wise mean differences. 
Results indicate that the average number of acquisition and investing purpose loans with IS 
covenants is statistically significantly greater than both operating and financing purpose loans, 
before controlling for financial constraint variables and other variables. This finding is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. We also find a more frequent use of IS covenants for 
operating loans relative to financing loans; and the difference is statistically significant at the 5% 
level (t = 2.04, p-value = 0.04144). 
 Similar mean differences for BS-based covenants are shown in Panel B of Table 5. Loans 
prepared for acquisition and investing purpose loans have a less frequent use of BS-based 
covenants compared to operating and financing purpose loans, and operating loans have a 
significantly lower average use of BS covenants. These differences are statistically significant at 
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the 1% level. In general, evidence from mean differences offers support for our three hypotheses 
and suggests that loan purpose is an important factor in determining the type of debt covenant 
attached to a loan.  
 In Table 6, we present results for our four different multinomial logit specifications based 
on financial constraint controls as Models 1-4. We report coefficient estimates that indicate the 
impact of loan purpose and financial constraints. In general, coefficient estimates on other 
control variables are consistent across models and across our two dependent variable 
specifications. While coefficient magnitudes vary somewhat, sign and significance remain 
largely unchanged. Specifically, we find that the total debt size (Dealsize) and whether the deal 
is secured (Secured) decrease the likelihood of a debt contract containing a BS covenant and 
increase the likelihood of inclusion of an IS covenant. Conversely, firm size (Size), the book-to-
market ratio of the borrowing firm (Book-to-Market), and asset tangibility (Tangible) all have a 
positive impact on the likelihood of the use of a BS covenant but decrease the likelihood of an IS 
covenant. Finally, the estimated impact of months to maturity on the debt (Maturity) decreases 
the likelihood of a BS covenant and increases the likelihood of an IS covenant. Estimates of the 
impact of loan maturity suggest a potential risk response in providing debt to firms, as lenders 
may consider income statement ratios as a better indicator of the long-term health of the 
borrowing firm. These results fit well with our subsequent estimates, as they relate to long-term 
financing.8  
(Insert Table 6 about here.) 
 In our sample, every loan observation has some type of covenant so the choice set for the 
dependent variable includes either only an IS covenant, only a BS covenant, or both types of 
 
8 Full regression results are reported in Appendix B, Table 6-A. 
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covenants. Our model estimates coefficients for the IS and BS choices, treating both as the 
normalized category. Therefore, our results are somewhat conservative in that they identify, for 
example, the impact of having an IS covenant relative to having no IS covenant or both types of 
covenant.9  In addition, the first set of models in Table 6 focuses only on loan purpose for 
acquisition and investing relative to all other purposes without distinguishing between operating 
and financing.  
 Table 6 shows regression estimates and p-values for statistical significance. Focusing on 
our primary variable of interest, we find that LoanPurpose_Inv&Acq has a positive impact on the 
likelihood of a loan containing an IS covenant and a negative impact on the likelihood of a loan 
containing a BS covenant. These impacts are consistent and statistically significant across all 
four models. Estimates indicate that covenants attached to the loans borrowed to fund investing 
or acquisition activities are more likely to include income statement based ratios than non-
acquisition and non-investing purpose loans. Similarly, loans borrowed to fund investing or 
acquisition activities are less likely to include balance sheet based ratios.  
 More specifically, in Table 6, -0.3979, the coefficient on the variable 
BS:LoanPurpose_Inv&Acq in Model 1 indicates that loan contracts for investment & acquisition 
purposes are less likely to include balance-sheet-based ratio covenants as compared to loan 
contracts for other purposes. On the other hand, 0.3369, the coefficient on 
IS:LoanPurpose_Inv&Acq in Model 1 indicates that debt contracts for investment and 
acquisition purposes are more likely to use income-statement-based ratio covenants in loan 
contracts. The remaining models, Models 2-4, show consistent patterns with the same directions 
 
9 We also estimated bivariate logit models in which the dependent variable indicated the existence of a balance sheet 
covenant, whether or not it was also accompanied by an income statement covenant. Similarly, we repeated the 
regressions for income statement covenants. Empirical results are qualitatively identical and similar in magnitude. 
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(signs) and comparable magnitudes of coefficients. In general, our results suggest that loan 
purpose is an important component in determining the structure of debt contracts. These results 
offer support for Hypothesis 1. Furthermore, all financing constraint variables have the expected 
sign and are significant across all models. 
 To test Hypotheses 2a and 2b, we run models similar to 1-4 but replace 
LoanPurpose_Inv&Acq with the variables LoanPurpose_Oper and LoanPurpose_Finan. Results, 
labeled as models 1a-4a and shown in Table 7, confirm results from our previous specification. 
Again, finance constraints have the expected impact. Across all four models, we find that 
LoanPurpose_Oper and LoanPurpose_Finan have a positive effect on the likelihood of a BS 
covenant being in place. This suggests a more frequent use of BS covenants when loans are for 
either operating or financing activities, similar to results from Table 6. Regarding the use of an 
IS debt covenant, negative coefficients indicate a decreased likelihood when the loan is for 
operating or financing activities.  Coefficients are consistent across the four models and 
statistically significant at least at 0.05 level.  
(Insert Table 7 about here.) 
 From Table 7, the Model 1 coefficients on BS:LoanPurpose_Oper and BS: 
LoanPurpose_Finan, 0.3937 and 0.3998, respectively indicate that loans for the purpose of 
operating and financing activities include balance-sheet-based ratios more often in loan 
covenants, compared to loans for investment and acquisition. Similarly, the -0.3502 and -0.3234 
coefficients on IS:LoanPurpose_Oper and IS:LoanPurpose_Finan in Model 1 shows that debt 
covenants for these activities are less likely to include income-statement-based ratios than loan 
covenants for other purposes. The coefficients in the remaining Models 2-4 show consistent 
results and have the same signs and similar magnitudes as in Model 1. These results, similar to 
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earlier results, imply that different financial ratios are used differently across different loan 
purposes.  
 Overall, regression results in Table 7 provide strong support for Hypothesis 2a and 
Hypothesis 2b. That is, loans borrowed to fund daily corporate operating activities and financing 
purposes are significantly less likely to include covenants with income-statement-based ratios 
and more likely to include covenants with balance-sheet-based ratios.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Private debt financing is a key element of business activity, as firms use loans for a 
variety of purposes, including funding daily corporate operations, repaying debt, and funding 
merger and acquisition related deals. Along with an increase in the use of business loans, 
financial covenants in debt contracts have emerged as a common and useful tool to increase 
efficiency in lending. Such covenants frequently make use of financial ratios derived from 
income statements and/or balance sheets to ensure that the borrower is meeting a threshold of 
financial stability.  
In this study, we examined how the use of specific types of debt covenants, based on 
balance sheet or income statement information, is related to the purpose of the loan. Overall, our 
findings imply that the loan purpose is a significant factor in determining the choice of 
accounting information used in covenants. Our results extend the findings of Christensen and 
Nikolaev (2012) to include the loan purpose in addition to other financing constraints. 
Specifically, we provide evidence that debt covenants for a loan borrowed for daily corporate 
operations and financing activities are more likely to contain balance-sheet-based covenants, and 
less likely to contain income-statement-based covenants. Conversely, debt covenants for a loan 
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borrowed for long-term investment or acquisitions are more likely to contain income-statement- 
based covenants, and less likely to contain balance-sheet-based covenants.  
Overall, our results provide important evidence regarding the connection between debt 
covenant structure and loan purpose. In doing so, it contributes to the literature on debt contract 
design (for example, Dichev and Skinner 2002; Chava and Roberts 2008; Demerjian 2011; 
Christensen and Nikolaev 2012). Despite much interest in debt contract design, Skinner (2011) 
argues that we still have incomplete knowledge of the economic factors that structure debt 
contracts. Income-statement based covenants depend on measures of profitability and efficiency, 
and act as trip wires that transfer control rights to lenders when borrowing firms’ performance 
deteriorates. On the other hand, balance-sheet-based covenants rely on information about sources 
and uses of capital, and align interests between borrowing firms and lenders by restricting the 
borrower’s capital structure. We show that loan purpose is significantly associated with the 
choice between income-statement-based- and balance-sheet-based covenants. This result further 
illustrates ways in which accounting information improves contracting efficiency.  
 Our results are limited to the U.S. market with its institutional structure. In future studies, 
it would be interesting to perform similar investigations on firms in other countries. An 
additional line of research that would extend our findings could investigate the relation between 






Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
(IS Covenantit, BS Covenantit, Both Covenants) = f(β0k + β(2k to 3k)* LoanPurposeit  
 + β(4k to Jk)* Financial Constraint Variablesit + β10k *VRit + β11k*Sizeit + β12k*Book-to-Marketit  
 + β13k*ROAit + β14k*Lossit + β15k* Advit + β16k*R&Dit + β17k*Tangibleit + β18k*Z-Scoreit  
 + β19k*StdRetit + β20k*DealSizeit + β21k*Maturityit  + β22k*Revolverit+ β23k*Securedit)   
      
           (Model 1-4)                                                                                                    
 where k indicates inclusion of balance-sheet-based ratios or income-statement-based ratio. 
 
  IS Covenantit  = An indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if a loan deal has only an 
income-statement-based covenant; 0 otherwise 
  BS Covenantit 
 
= An indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if a loan deal has only a 
balance-sheet-based covenant; 0 otherwise 
  Both Covenantsit = An indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if a loan deal has a 
balance-sheet-based covenant and an income-statement-based covenant; 0 
otherwise. This serves as the reference category in our model. 
   
  LoanPurposeit = The purpose of the loan (LoanPurpose_Operit or LoanPurpose_Finanit or 
LoanPurpose_InvAcqit), where  
  LoanPurpose_Operit  = 1 if the purpose of the loan is to fund daily corporate operating activities; 
0 otherwise 
  LoanPurpose_Finanit = 1 if the purpose of the loan is to fund financing activities; 0 otherwise 
  LoanPurpose_Inv&Acqit = 1 if the purpose of the loan is to fund investing or acquisition activities; 0 
otherwise 
Financial Constraint Variables (in 4 alternative models) 
Model 1:  
Ageit    = Natural logarithm of the number of years the firm in CRSP 
Dividendsit = Dividend yield defined as the ratio of common dividends to the market 
value of equity  
Leverageit   = Ratio of long-term debt to market value of total assets 
Model 2:    
FinConstraint-WWit   = Index of financial constraints based on Whited and Wu (2006) 
Model 3:   
FinConstraint-KZit     = Index of financial constraints based on Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
Model 4:   
FinConstraints-CLit     = Index of financial constraints based on Cleary (1999) 
 
More specifically,  
 
  
FinConstraint-WW = − 0.091 ∗CFit − 0.062 ∗DIVPOSit + 0.021∗TLTDit – 0.044 ∗LNTAit 
   +0.102 ∗ISGit +0.035 ∗SGit,, where  
            CF = ratio of cash flow to total assets 
            DIVPOS = indicator that takes the value of one if the firm pays  
                               cash dividends 
            TLTD = ratio of the long-term debt to total assets, LNTA is the  
                        natural log of total assets 
            ISG = firm’s three-digit industry sales growth 
            SG = firm’s sales growth.  
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FinConstraint-KZ =   −1.002 ∗ CashFlow/Kit + 0.28 ∗ Qit + 3.139 ∗ Debt/TotalCapitali 
     − 39.368 ∗ Dividends/Kit  − 1.315 ∗ Cash/Kit, where  
             CashFlow/K = earnings before extraordinary items plus  
                          depreciation divided by the net value of                                  
                          property, plant, and equipment (PPE) 
Q = Tobin’s Q (Market value of equity + Book value of debt) /  
                 Long-term debt plus equity 
Debt/TotalCapital = Long-term debt / Sum of long-term debt  
                               and equity 
Dividends/K = (Common dividends + Preferred dividends) /  
                            Net PPE                                   
Cash/K = (Cash + Cash equivalents) / Net PPE 
 
FinConstraint-CL =       0.0432 ∗ Currentit − 0.0011 ∗ FCCovit + 0.0039 ∗ Slack/Kit 
             −3.3525 ∗ NIit − 0.5723 ∗ SalesGrowthit + 0.6067 ∗ Debtit, where 
      Current = Current assets/ Current liabilities 
      FCCov = (Pretax income – interest) / (Interest + Preferred dividends)                                              
      Slack/K = (cash + 0.5 ∗ inventory + 0.70 ∗ accounts receivable 
                         – short term loans) / net PPE  
      NI = Net Income Margin = Income before extraordinary items/Sales 
      Sales growth = Annual growth in sales revenue 
      Debt = Long-term debt / Total assets.                        
 
Other Control Variables   
VR = Ratio of Book Value Volatility to Adjusted Net Income Volatility (Book 
Value Volatility/ Adjusted Net Income Volatility); Book Value Volatility 
is the five-year standard deviation of changes in retained earnings plus 
dividends. Adjusted Net Income Volatility is the five-year standard 
deviation of Net Income minus Special Items and Non-Operating Income 
and Expense –  based on Demerjian (2011). 
Size = Natural logarithm of the market value of total assets (log(AT – SEQ 
         + PRCCF×CSHO)) 
Book-to-Market = Book-to-market ratio (Compustat: SEQ/(PRCCF×CSHO)) 
ROA = Return on assets (Income before extraordinary items / Total assets) 
Loss = An indicator variable (1 if the firm has negative net income; 0 otherwise) 
Adv = Advertising expense divided by total revenue (Compustat: XADV/REVT) 
R&D = R&D expense divided by total revenue (Compustat: XRD/REVT). 
Missing R&D expense is replaced with zeros 
Tangible = Asset tangibility defined as the ratio of net value of property, plant, and 
equipment to total assets (Compustat: PPENT/AT) 
Z-Score = Altman’s credit risk score computed as  
         Z = 1.2 ∗ (Current Assets – Current Liabilities)/Total Assets + 1.4 ∗  
             Retained Earnings/Total Assets + 3.3 ∗ Pretax Income/Total  
             Assets + 0.6 ∗ Market Capitalization/Total Liabilities  
             + 0.999 ∗ Revenue/Total Assets.  
StdRet = Natural logarithm of the standard deviation of daily returns over the 
fiscal year. 
DealSize = Natural logarithm of total deal 
Maturity = Months to maturity 










Appendix B: TABLE 6-A – Coefficients on Control Variables in TABLE 6 
 
Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Control Variables         
BS: VR  -0.0813**  -0.0698**  -0.0636*  -0.0629
* 
  (0.0202)  (0.0423)  (0.0627)  (0.0633) 
IS: VR  0.0405**  0.0409**  0.0403**  0.0359
* 
  (0.0323)  (0.0288)  (0.0311)  (0.0523) 
BS: Size  0.5087***  0.1049  0.5546***  0.5447
*** 
  (0.0000)  (0.1723)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
IS: Size  -0.0498  -0.0097  -0.0697*  -0.0505 
  (0.2173)  (0.8568)  (0.0803)  (0.2093) 
BS: Book-to-Market  0.2233***  0.0676  0.1988***  0.1961
*** 
  (0.0048)  (0.3445)  (0.0070)  (0.0083) 
IS: Book-to-Market  -0.1520**  -0.0767  -0.1067*  -0.1229
* 
  (0.0127)  (0.1741)  (0.0655)  (0.0332) 
BS: ROA  -0.6930  0.0390  -1.8612*  -0.9287 
  (0.4666)  (0.9683)  (0.0512)  (0.3894) 
IS: ROA  0.6976  0.6069  0.8252  2.5939*** 
  (0.2843)  (0.3527)  (0.2118)  (0.0005) 
BS: Loss  0.1568  0.0763  0.0431  0.0842 
  (0.3605)  (0.6509)  (0.7980)  (0.6218) 
IS: Loss  0.4429***  0.4794***  0.4811***  0.3802*** 
  (0.0001)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0007) 
BS: Adv  -4.0887  -3.4434  -4.9543*  -2.8803 
  (0.1014)  (0.1721)  (0.0557)  (0.2430) 
IS: Adv  7.4038***  7.0457***  7.1373***  6.5908*** 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
BS: R&D  8.7488***  8.6646***  7.1368***  7.2224*** 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
IS: R&D  0.4017  0.0693  0.4294  0.3989 
  (0.6720)  (0.9409)  (0.6445)  (0.6687) 
BS: Tangible  0.8146***  0.6449***  1.2916***  0.6399*** 
  (0.0001)  (0.0016)  (0.0000)  (0.0017) 
IS: Tangible  -2.2014***  -2.0683***  -2.1520***  -1.9642*** 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
BS: Z-Score  -0.0297  0.0163  -0.0201  -0.0172 
  (0.1729)  (0.3898)  (0.2906)  (0.3713) 
IS: Z-Score  -0.0059  -0.0271*  -0.0229  -0.0153 
  (0.7069)  (0.0692)  (0.1148)  (0.2962) 
BS: StdRet  5.3220  4.4275  -2.3229  -4.5649 
  (0.2162)  (0.2990)  (0.5843)  (0.2922) 
IS: StdRet  -2.3465  -0.5611  0.0785  1.1230 
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  (0.3823)  (0.8340)  (0.9762)  (0.6704) 
BS: DealSize  -0.2588***  -0.2678***  -0.2377***  -0.2457*** 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
IS: DealSize  0.2786***  0.3035***  0.2999***  0.2872*** 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
BS: Maturity  -0.0257***  -0.0255***  -0.0257***  -0.0258*** 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
IS: Maturity  0.0109***  0.0118***  0.0118***  0.0115*** 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
BS: Revolver  0.4036***  0.4130***  0.3890***  0.4050*** 
  (0.0009)  (0.0006)  (0.0011)  (0.0006) 
IS: Revolver  0.0412  0.0114  0.0076  0.0210 
  (0.5714)  (0.8743)  (0.9163)  (0.7716) 
BS: Secured  -0.1386  -0.2285**  -0.3787***  -0.3913*** 
  (0.2412)  (0.0492)  (0.0009)  (0.0006) 
IS: Secured  0.4548***  0.5509  0.5732***  0.5907*** 
  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Year fixed effects  Included  Included  Included  Included 
No. of observations  6,613  6,613  6,613  6,613 
 






) = β0k + β(1k to 3k)* LoanPurposeit + β(4k to 9k)* Financial Constraint Variablesit  
                            + β10k *VRit + β11k*Sizeit + β12k*Book-to-Marketit + β13k*ROAit + β14k*Lossit + β15k* Advit   
                            + β16k*R&Dit + β17k*Tangibleit + β18k*Z-Scoreit + β19k*StdRetit + β20k*DealSizeit  
                            + β21k*Maturityit  + β22k*Revolverit+ β23k*Securedit                                           (Model 1-4)                                                                                                    
 
                 where k indicates inclusion of balance-sheet-based ratios or income-statement-based ratio. 
 
All variables are defined in Appendix A.  The numbers in parentheses are p-values.  ***, **, * indicate 
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 TABLE 1 
Financial Debt Covenants 
 








 Mean Median 
Income Statement Interest Coverage Ratio     
    Earnings to cash interest          7 0.1% 209 100 
    Earnings to fixed charge 448 6.8% 282 125 
    Earnings to interest expense 195 2.9% 723 425 
 Debt-to-Earnings Ratio     
    Debt to EBITDA 3,903 59.0% 436 220 
    Senior debt to EBITDA 116 1.8% 212 65.25 
      
Balance Sheet Current Ratio     
    Current ratio 134 2.0% 214 75 
    Debt service coverage 76 1.1% 122 34.44 
    Quick ratio 33 0.5% 52 15 
 Net Worth Ratio     
    Debt to tangible net worth 496 7.5% 164 23.35 
 Leverage Ratio     
    Debt to equity 33 0.5% 148 50 
    Debt to assets 1,170 17.7% 677 350 
 Debt Amount     
    Senior leverage 1 0.0% 235 235 
 Total 6,613 100.0% 441 200 
 
In this table, the most common financial debt covenants are first labeled by their relative financial statement (income 
statement vs. balance sheet) followed by their subcategory. The six types (subcategories) of financial ratio covenants 
include the following: 1. interest coverage, 2. debt-to-earnings, 3. current ratio, 4. net worth, 5. leverage, and 6. debt 





Loan Purpose Distributions 
 




Specific Type of Loan 
Purpose 
Num. of Obs. Percent Deal Amount ($million) 
Group Specific (%) Mean Median 
Acquisition & Investing 1,010  15.3% $684  $250  
 
Acquisition 966  14.6% 699 252 
Takeover  671 10.1% 810 310 
Acquisition line  271 4.1% 428 175 
LBO (Leveraged buyout)  24 0.4% 635 260 
Investing 44  0.7% 362 100 
Capital expenditure  29 0.4% 448 142 
Equipment purchase  10 0.2% 34 41 
Security purchase  2 0.0% 129 129 
Telcom buildout  2 0.0% 813 813 
Real estate purchase  1 0.0% 700 700 
 
Operating 4,011  60.7% 409 200 
 
Corporate daily operating 
activities 
 2,153 32.6% 499 275 
Working capital  1,858 28.1% 305 150 
      
Financing 1,592  24.1% 366 160 
 
Debt repayment  1,207 18.3% 272 115 
CP backup  253 3.8% 812 500 
IPO (Initial Public 
Offering) financing  
 80 1.2% 396 170 
Projects finance  15 0.2% 175 50 
Spinoff  11 0.2% 424 350 
Recapitalization    10 0.2% 244 138 
Dividend recapitalization  6 0.1% 358 188 
Ship finance  5 0.1% 268 67 
Debtor-in-possession  2 0.0% 390 390 




1 0.0% 8 8 
    
 
      
Overall   6,613  100.0%
% 
















1996 62 16.8% 97 26.4% 209 56.8% 368 
1997 83 18.4% 117 26.0% 250 55.6% 450 
1998 119 30.4% 80 20.5% 192 49.1% 391 
1999 99 26.9% 70 19.0% 199 54.1% 368 
2000 68 20.5% 79 23.8% 185 55.7% 332 
2001 47 11.5% 200 48.9% 162 39.6% 409 
2002 50 10.4% 322 67.2% 107 22.3% 479 
2003 35 7.4% 361 76.6% 75 15.9% 471 
2004 71 12.9% 423 76.8% 57 10.3% 551 
2005 71 13.6% 418 79.9% 34 6.5% 523 
2006 78 18.1% 320 74.1% 34 7.9% 432 
2007 74 20.8% 260 73.0% 22 6.2% 356 
2008 48 19.8% 179 74.0% 15 6.2% 242 
2009 12 7.3% 143 87.2% 9 5.5% 164 
2010 21 9.5% 189 85.9% 10 4.5% 220 
2011 25 7.3% 311 90.4% 8 2.3% 344 
2012 32 11.9% 221 82.2% 16 5.9% 269 
2013 15 6.1% 221 90.6% 8 3.3% 244 









































1996 569 36.9% 93 9.5% 245 53.6% 
1997 685 36.7% 112 8.5% 339 54.8% 
1998 656 65.6% 99 6.7% 172 27.7% 
1999 371 32.8% 166 10.4% 319 56.8% 
2000 581 32.0% 152 9.7% 389 58.3% 
2001 737 22.1% 290 37.0% 394 40.8% 
2002 439 15.9% 237 55.2% 373 28.9% 
2003 325 8.2% 242 62.6% 545 29.3% 
2004 462 14.3% 367 67.6% 730 18.1% 
2005 797 20.1% 482 71.6% 684 8.3% 
2006 606 20.2% 511 69.8% 691 10.0% 
2007 790 27.3% 574 69.7% 292 3.0% 
2008 1,131 46.6% 314 48.2% 398 5.1% 
2009 293 6.4% 337 87.9% 343 5.6% 
2010 1,124 18.7% 494 74.0% 917 7.3% 
2011 1,217 11.8% 709 85.4% 916 2.8% 
2012 1,516 26.9% 556 68.2% 545 4.8% 
2013 1,404 11.6% 705 85.6% 637 2.8% 
Total 684 23.7% 409 56.3% 366 20.0% 
 
Panel A of this table displays our sample loan deals based on loan purpose and loan deal amount. Panel B reports the 
frequency of loan deals by loan purposes over our sample period, along with the portion of total loans each year that 
were used for a specific purpose. Panel C reports similar statistics to Panel B but in terms of loan value. Panel C 
shows the mean value of loan deals by loan purpose for each year. The “% of total” in Panel C refers to total value 























Loan Purpose and Covenant Type 
 









 IS BS IS BS IS BS 
1996 93.5% 56.5% 71.1% 76.3% 84.7% 71.8% 
1997 91.6% 30.1% 70.9% 75.2% 82.8% 67.2% 
1998 95.8% 39.5% 76.3% 71.3% 84.9% 56.3% 
1999 96.0% 31.3% 84.3% 54.3% 88.4% 48.2% 
2000 95.6% 35.3% 73.4% 59.5% 85.9% 44.3% 
2001 95.7% 23.4% 89.5% 44.0% 88.9% 38.9% 
2002 98.0% 24.0% 91.6% 37.0% 84.1% 47.7% 
2003 97.1% 25.7% 92.0% 33.8% 77.3% 42.7% 
2004 93.0% 23.9% 92.9% 31.7% 82.5% 36.8% 
2005 94.4% 12.7% 89.0% 32.3% 91.2% 20.6% 
2006 91.0% 16.7% 86.6% 28.8% 97.1% 11.8% 
2007 95.9% 16.2% 88.5% 25.0% 90.9% 13.6% 
2008 91.7% 16.7% 85.5% 35.8% 60.0% 40.0% 
2009 91.7% 16.7% 92.3% 26.6% 88.9% 44.4% 
2010 90.5% 19.0% 89.9% 25.9% 70.0% 30.0% 
2011 92.0% 8.0% 83.9% 29.9% 75.0% 37.5% 
2012 84.4% 18.8% 87.8% 23.5% 87.5% 18.8% 
2013 80.0% 20.0% 82.8% 23.5% 87.5% 37.5% 
       




















    







Panel B: Portion of Loans with IS/BS Covenant (as percent of loans with covenant) 
 
 Income Statement Balance Sheet 
 Inv&Acq  
 
Operating Financing Inv&Acq Operating Financing 
1996 19.1% 22.7% 58.2% 13.5% 28.6% 57.9% 
1997 20.8% 22.7% 56.6% 8.9% 31.3% 59.8% 
1998 33.7% 18.0% 48.2% 22.2% 26.9% 50.9% 
1999 28.8% 17.9% 53.3% 18.8% 23.0% 58.2% 
2000 23.0% 20.6% 56.4% 15.7% 30.7% 53.6% 
2001 12.2% 48.6% 39.1% 6.8% 54.3% 38.9% 
2002 11.3% 68.0% 20.7% 6.6% 65.4% 28.0% 
2003 8.0% 78.3% 13.7% 5.5% 74.8% 19.6% 
2004 13.0% 77.7% 9.3% 9.9% 77.9% 12.2% 
2005 14.3% 79.1% 6.6% 6.0% 89.4% 4.6% 
2006 18.6% 72.7% 8.7% 11.9% 84.4% 3.7% 
2007 22.1% 71.7% 6.2% 15.0% 81.3% 3.8% 
2008 21.4% 74.3% 4.4% 10.3% 82.1% 7.7% 
2009 7.3% 87.4% 5.3% 4.5% 86.4% 9.1% 
2010 9.7% 86.7% 3.6% 7.1% 87.5% 5.4% 
2011 7.9% 90.0% 2.1% 2.0% 94.9% 3.1% 
2012 11.5% 82.6% 6.0% 9.8% 85.2% 4.9% 
2013 5.9% 90.6% 3.5% 5.2% 89.7% 5.2% 
 
This table displays the count of loans by purpose and by source of information (income statement vs. balance sheet). 
Panel A reports the number of loans for each purpose with an income statement (IS) debt covenant as a percent of 
the total number of loans for that purpose, and similarly for balance sheet (BS) debt covenants. Panel B shows the 








Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
IScovenants 0.878 1.000 0.328 0.000 1.000 
BScovenants 0.376 0.000 0.484 0.000 1.000 
Age 2.750 2.773 0.833 0.000 4.477 
Dividends 0.009 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.294 
Leverage 0.187 0.161 0.149 0.000 0.873 
FinConstraint-WW -0.312 -0.310 0.094 -0.527 -0.091 
FinConstraint-KZ -0.808 0.443 4.007 -29.896 4.048 
FinConstraint-CL 0.003 0.005 0.374 -1.460 1.480 
VR 1.903 1.294 1.989 0.177 45.127 
Size 7.230 7.302 1.783 1.801 11.901 
Book-to-Market 0.660 0.510 0.658 0.001 21.564 
ROA 0.036 0.040 0.071 -0.645 0.433 
Loss 0.198 0.000 0.398 0.000 1.000 
Adv 0.010 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.385 
R&D 0.018 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.487 
Tangible 0.330 0.257 0.243 0.005 0.970 
Z-Score 3.299 2.773 2.720 -6.905 53.640 
Stdret 0.030 0.026 0.016 0.007 0.241 
Dealsize 18.979 19.114 1.500 11.850 23.288 
Maturity 47.267 57.000 21.948 1.000 252.000 
Revolver 0.665 1.000 0.472 0.000 1.000 




This table reports summary statistics for the variables included in our main regressions. All variables are defined in 


















Mean Difference Results 
 
Panel A: Type of Debt Covenants by Loan Purpose 
 
Loan Purpose IS BS 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Acq. & Inv. 0.94 0.24 0.27 0.44 
Operating 0.87 0.33 0.35 0.48 
Financing 0.85 0.36 0.51 0.50 
 
 
Panel B: Differences in Type of Covenants by Loan Purpose 
 
Overall Differences    
 Test Statistic p-value  
IS Covenant 44.64*** < 0.0001  
BS Covenant 178.06*** < 0.0001  
    
 
IS Covenant    
 Mean Difference t-statistic p-value 
Acq. & Inv. vs. Operating 0.06
*** 7.00 < 0.0001 
Acq. & Inv. vs. Financing 0.09
*** 7.33 < 0.0001 
Operating vs. Financing 0.02
** 2.04 0.04144 
 
    
 
BS Covenant    
 Mean Difference t-statistic p-value 
Acq. & Inv. vs. Operating -0.08
*** -5.27 < 0.0001 
Acq. & Inv. vs. Financing -0.24
*** -12.79 < 0.0001 
Operating vs. Financing -0.16





This table presents mean differences for the prevalence of IS and BS covenants. Panel A reports the portion of loans 
in our sample that contains an IS or BS covenant, disaggregated by loan purpose. Panel B reports statistical tests for 
the mean difference in use of IS-based and BS-based covenants across loan purpose types. We use a chi-squared test 











B/S & I/S Covenant and Loan Purpose of Investing & Acquisition:  
Multinomial Logit Regression 
 









  (0.0220)  (0.0360)  (0.0183)  (0.0226) 





  (0.0008)  (0.0007)  (0.0007)  (0.0000) 
BS: Age  0.1002       
  (0.1358)       
IS: Age  -0.1896
***       
  (0.0000)       
BS: Dividends  0.9914
***       
  (0.0000)       
IS: Dividends  -0.1445
*       
  (0.0732)       
BS: Leverage  -1.4787
***       
  (0.0015)       
IS: Leverage  1.1525
***       
  (0.0001)       
BS: FinConstraint_WW    -10.7227
***     
    (0.0000)     
IS: FinConstraint_WW    1.3860     
    (0.1169)     
BS: FinConstraint_KZ      -0.0840
***   
      (0.0000)   
IS: FinConstraint_KZ      0.0080   
      (0.4518)   
BS: FinConstraint_CL        0.0085 
        (0.9613) 
IS: FinConstraint_CL        0.6644
*** 
        (0.0000) 
Other control variables   Included  Included  Included  Included 
Year fixed effects  Included  Included  Included  Included 
No. of observations  6,613  6,613  6,613  6,613 
         





) = β0k + β(1k to 3k)* LoanPurposeit + β(4k to 9k)* Financial Constraint Variablesit  
                            + β10k *VRit + β11k*Sizeit + β12k*Book-to-Marketit + β13k*ROAit + β14k*Lossit + β15k* Advit   
                            + β16k*R&Dit + β17k*Tangibleit + β18k*Z-Scoreit + β19k*StdRetit + β20k*DealSizeit  
                            + β21k*Maturityit  + β22k*Revolverit+ β23k*Securedit                                           (Model 1-4)                                                                                                    
 




All variables are defined in Appendix A.  The numbers in parentheses are p-values.  ***, **, * indicate statistical 
















































B/S & I/S Covenant and Loan Purpose of Operating & Financing:  
Multinomial Logit Regression 
 
























  (0.0034)  (0.0031)  (0.0029)  (0.0003) 
BS: Age  0.1000       
  (0.1366)       
IS: Age  -0.1899
***       
  (0.0000)       
BS: Dividends  0.9915
***       
  (0.0000)       
IS: Dividends  -0.1439
*       
  (0.0743)       
BS: Leverage  -1.4794
***       
  (0.0015)       
IS: Leverage  1.1510
***       
  (0.0001)       
BS: FinConstraint_WW    -10.7236
***     
    (0.0000)     
IS: FinConstraint_WW    1.3809     
    (0.1182)     
BS: FinConstraint_KZ      -0.0840
***   
      (0.0000)   
IS: FinConstraint_KZ      0.0080   
      (0.4550)   
BS: FinConstraint_CL        0.0086 
        (0.9608) 
IS: FinConstraint_CL        0.6637
*** 
        (0.0000) 
Other control variables   Included  Included  Included  Included 
Year fixed effects  Included  Included  Included  Included 
No. of observations  6,613  6,613  6,613  6,613 
 






) = β0k + β(1k to 3k)* LoanPurposeit + β(4k to 9k)* Financial Constraint Variablesit  
42 
 
                            + β10k *VRit + β11k*Sizeit + β12k*Book-to-Marketit + β13k*ROAit + β14k*Lossit + β15k* Advit   
                            + β16k*R&Dit + β17k*Tangibleit + β18k*Z-Scoreit + β19k*StdRetit + β20k*DealSizeit  
                            + β21k*Maturityit  + β22k*Revolverit+ β23k*Securedit                                           (Model 1-4)                                                                                                    
 
                 where k indicates inclusion of balance-sheet-based ratios or income-statement-based ratio. 
 
All variables are defined in Appendix A.  The numbers in parentheses are p-values.  ***, **, * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
